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Abstract The paper investigates firms’ behavior and outcomes (levels of cost-
reducing R&D, output, profit and welfare in equilibrium) in a differentiated duopoly
with process innovation. One of the important features in this paper is that spillovers
operate in the R&D stage and are tied to the degree of product substitutability as
well as the extent of technological proximity/alienation of the research paths leading
to cost reduction. Using this feature, the paper tries to explore and compare four
separate organization setups (Full Competition, Semi-collusion in Production, Semi-
collusion in R&D and Full Collusion). It is found that under technological prox-
imity, competitions at the upstream stage depress R&D investment, and firms
colluding in R&D regardless of their production strategy always yield more profit
and generate higher social welfare than firms colluding in output; under techno-
logical alienation, R&D cooperation may reduce firms’ interest to invest in R&D,
and it is possible that firms in the Full Collusion regime produce most and generate
the highest level of social welfare.
Keywords R&D  Spillover  Semi-collusion  Product differentiation  Horizontal
merger
JEL Classification D43  L13  O31
& Kai Zhao
kai.zhao@hotmail.fr
1 Institute for quantitative economics, Research center for the applied statistics and big data,
Huaqiao University, 668, Jimei Avenue, 361021 Xiamen, China
123
Lat Am Econ Rev (2015) 24:4
DOI 10.1007/s40503-015-0018-6
1 Introduction
Nowadays, economies in Latin America are becoming more and more knowledge
based. Innovation becomes essential to spur economic growth and to raise living
standards. At the firm level, either competition or collusion could reward innovation
by providing strong incentives for firms to be more efficient than their rivals. This
paper aims to study the extent to which innovation incentives in a duopoly change
according to the extent of product substitutability and the ‘‘technological distance’’
of firms. We draw particular attention to firms’ (full/partial) collusive behavior and
attempt to address the following questions: What type of collusion (partial, full,
none) should firms choose, and which one is more conducive to technological
advancement and a firm’s growth? How do firms choose different types of collusion,
and how do these affect market outcomes? Can the collusive strategy improve the
consumer surplus and the social welfare, and which one serves best?
Innovation through R&D investment leads to more efficient use of resources,
creating sustainable competitive advantages. The most important aspect of R&D
investment is the externality (spillovers) which has been studied through the
divergence between the social and private returns of production process. The public
goods feature of knowledge generates spillovers which allow others to use the
owner’s innovation free of charge. Due to the spillover effect, the rate of return from
an innovation is lesser and as a result, the incentives for carrying out R&D are
reduced. The individual firm fears that competitors use its internal research results
and thus probably increase their profits without having to bear the expenses.
Therefore, the researching firm will only have limited incentive to invest in R&D.
However, from the collective viewpoint, spillovers strengthen the dissemination of
new knowledge available for the whole society, and improve the social welfare
(Amir 2000).
Within a game where firms are first engaged in costly research efforts to adopt a
lower-cost technology and then compete in a Cournot fashion with homogeneous
products, (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988) (henceforth ‘‘AJ’’) show that firms
invest more under R&D cooperation than under R&D competition for sufficiently
high spillover effects (full competition versus full cooperation). Kamien et al.
(1992) (henceforth ‘‘KMZ’’) extend the AJ model to a more general framework with
product differentiation and allow firms to participate in a research joint venture
(RJV). They show that firms should be encouraged to form a RJV only if they
coordinate their R&D decisions while maintaining competition for sales. Concern-
ing the welfare effects of cooperative R&D with spillovers, cooperation raises social
welfare when the spillover is high (Suzumura 1992).
Compared to aforementioned works, this paper emphasizes the ‘‘close relation-
ship’’ between product differentiation and R&D spillovers. The key feature is to
consider that the extent of product differentiation determines the ability of a firm to
appropriate its rival’s R&D effort. In addition, this ability is influenced by the
sensibility of spillovers relative to product differentiation, in other words,
technological distance. Several explanations can be provided to justify this ‘‘close
relationship’’. First, when products are close substitutes, R&D efforts are less firm
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specific and a firm can more easily benefit from the discovery of a more efficient
production technique resulting from rival’s R&D effort. Second, the exchange of
technological information between engineers of competing firms is recognized as an
important source of R&D spillovers (Severinov 2001). Spillovers are believed to be
higher between technological neighbors. According to this view, the ability to make
productive use of another firm’s knowledge depends on the degree of technological
distance between firms. Every technology has a somewhat unique set of applications
and language. Researchers in similar technological fields will interact in profes-
sional organizations, publish in commonly read journals, and, increasingly, browse
a common set of web pages. It is natural to consider that the dissemination of
technological knowledge across competing firms is strong when firms’ technologies
are similar. Furthermore, the above-mentioned ‘‘close relationship’’ is divided into
two categories: concave relationship (technological proximity) where firms adopt
similar technologies (i.e., the similar smart phones produced by Apple, Blackberry,
Nokia ...), convex relationship (technological alienation) where firms adopt
different technologies (i.e., electricity can be produced by different technologies).
To be more concrete, we take the electricity production, for example, electric power
companies are differentiated by voltages, a commercial consumer may need a
voltage level of 11 kV or 440 V while a residential consumer needs power at level
of 240 V, this difference of voltages refers to product differentiation. The electricity
can be produced by different technologies (i.e., solar panels, wind turbines, nuclear
energy), this refers to the extent of technological distance. The R&D flow between
companies employing the same output (voltage) and the same technique is
obviously greater.
In location models, the distance between firms determines the degree of product
differentiation. By considering that R&D spillover depends negatively on firms’
product location, it is shown that R&D effort is positively associated with the
differentiation of products1 (Piga and Poyago-Theotoky 2005). However, they do
not address the important issue of cooperative behavior between firms in their
models.
In this paper, we consider a two-stage game where firms with heterogeneous
products competing in a Cournot fashion engage in upstream R&D and downstream
production. At each stage, the competing firms can either coordinate their decisions
or adopt non-cooperative strategy. This assumption allows us to compare the Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (henceforth ‘‘SPNE’’) emerging in the four separate
scenarios : full competition, semi-collusion in Production2, Semi-collusion in R&D3
and Full Collusion4. Compared to Kamien et al. (1992) which claim that the R&D
investment by firms engaged in Semi-collusion in R&D is unambiguously greater
than that in the Full Competition regime irrespective of spillovers, we demonstrate
in fact which regime generates more R&D effort in equilibrium depends upon both
1 The greater the distance between firms, the more differentiated the firms’ products, the less the R&D
spillover.
2 It is also called ‘‘Production Cartel’’, see Brod and Shivakumar (1999).
3 R&D Cartel.
4 The Full Collusion regime could also be considered as horizontal merger.
Lat Am Econ Rev (2015) 24:4 Page 3 of 27 4
123
the degree of product differentiation and the extent of technological distance. If we
restrict our attention to the concave relationship, Full Collusion participants spend
most on R&D, and Semi-collusion participants spend more than firms in the Full
Competition regime. This ranking of R&D efforts is unalterable and independent of
the product differentiation, and the competition at the upstream stage depresses
R&D investment. Firms colluding in R&D regardless of their production strategy
always yield more profit and generate higher social welfare than firms colluding in
output independently of R&D strategy. When products are close substitutes, the
synergy effects prevail over the anti-competitive effects due to the high spillovers,
Full Collusion becomes a welfare-enhancing regime. Focusing on the convex
relationship, R&D cooperation may reduce firms’ interest to invest in R&D, and it is
possible that firms in the Full Collusion regime produce most and generate the
highest level of social welfare. Furthermore, horizontal mergers might be
interpreted as a Full Collusion where the participants coordinate their decisions
with respect to all of strategic variables. Thus, we launch the discussion about
antitrust policy, and shed light on the leniency of the total welfare standard and the
restrictiveness of the consumer welfare standard.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
solves the SPNE in the four alternative regimes. We compare R&D effort, profit,
consumer surplus and social welfare according to firms’ behavior (competitive or
collusive) in Sect. 3. Section 4 concludes this paper.
2 The model
2.1 Hypothesis
Consider an industry with two firms producing imperfectly substitutable goods. The
representative consumer has a quasi-linear utility function
Uðqi; qjÞ ¼ aðqi þ qjÞ  1
2
ðq2i þ q2j þ 2cqiqjÞ ð1Þ
where ‘‘qi’’ is the output of firm i; ‘‘a’’ is a constant which is assumed to be
sufficiently large so that all firms product positive amounts in equilibrium; ‘‘c’’
measures the substitutability5 between the products and c 2 ½0; 1Þ. The utility
function generates the following inverse demand function faced by firm i:
piðqi; qjÞ ¼ a qi  cqj ð2Þ
The production technology exhibits a constant marginal cost ‘‘c’’ which can be
reduced by investing in R&D. Due to spillovers (b), the R&D effort not only leads
to a decrease in its own marginal cost, but also reduces the marginal cost of the rival
5 If c ¼ 0, firms’ products are not substitutable and each firm acts as a monopolist. Note that, when
products are perfect substitutes, the spillover obviously equals to 1 and the game cannot be solved. See
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
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firm. Given the R&D effort xj of firm j (j ¼ 1; 2 and i 6¼ j), firm i’s effective
marginal cost is
Ciðxi; xjÞ ¼ c xi  bxj ð3Þ
The R&D cost is assumed to be quadratic (1
2
x2i ), which reflects the decreasing
returns to R&D effort.
The individual profit of firm i is defined by




x2i with i 6¼ j; i; j ¼ 1; 2 ð4Þ
The social welfare is the sum of producer surplus (denoted by PS) and consumer
surplus (denoted by CS):
W ¼ PSþ CS with PS ¼ pi þ pj; CS ¼ U  piqi  pjqj ð5Þ
The key feature of the model is to consider that the extent of product substitutability
(c) determines the ability of a firm to appropriate its rival’ R&D effort. When
products are less differentiated, competing firms share closer technological spaces,
and one firm can benefit more from the rival’s effort. We assume that the rela-
tionship between the spillover parameter (b) and the degree of product differen-
tiation (c) is described by:






; c 2 ½0; 1Þ ð6Þ
where the parameter ‘‘h’’ determines both the sensibility of the R&D spillover to the
degree of product differentiation, in other words, the measure of technological
distance6, and the level of spillovers for a given value of differentiation (see Fig. 1).




 is necessary to guarantee the equilibrium existence in the
four alternative scenarios. The range of h permits us to touch upon the issue of
concavity (technological proximity, h\1) and convexity (technological alienation,
h[ 1). As oboc [ 0 and
ob
oh\0, we incur that, for any given value of c, the concave
relationship implies a more important spillover effect than the convex relationship.
From the perspective of technological distance, the concavity refers to the situations
where firms adopt similar technologies. Under concavity condition, the more dif-
ferentiated are the products (close to 0), R&D spillovers are more sensitive to c. One
can imagine that the concavity (h\1) corresponds to industries that are geo-
graphically concentrated and that rely upon sources of basic scientific knowledge or
general purpose technologies (GPT) in the cluster7 benefit most from the exchange
of knowledge and technology. By contrast, under convexity condition, the less
differentiated are products (close to 1), the more sensitive R&D spillovers with
respect to c, and the convexity delineates the situations where firms adopt different
technologies.
6 From the perspective of technological distance, it is straightforward that the more technologies are
similar, the greater are spillovers, for a given level of product differentiation.
7 See more in Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Baptista and Swann (1998).
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We consider a two-stage game where firms act simultaneously at each stage.
Firms select a strategic action (R&D effort) at the first stage anticipating correctly
its impact at the second stage. The two competing firms can either coordinate their
decisions or adopt non-cooperative strategy at each stage. When firms collude in
one dimension (R&D or production) and compete in another one, such behavior is
called semi-collusion (Fershtman and Gandal 1994). We compare the SPNE
emerging in the four alternative scenarios (Table 1) such as Full Competition, Semi-
collusion in Production, Semi-collusion in R&D and Full Collusion.
2.2 Sub-game equilibrium in the four regimes
2.2.1 Full competition
We begin with regime F, where there is no cooperation in any of the stages. The
SPNE is obtained by backward induction. Firm i chooses output qi to maximize







¼ Að2 cÞ þ ð2 c
hþ1ÞxFi þ ð2ch  cÞxFj
4 c2 withA ¼ a c[ 0 ð7Þ
The sign of the derivative
oqFi ðxFi ;xFj Þ
oxF
i
is unambiguously positive, it demonstrates that
the output of firm i increases with its own R&D effort. By contrast, concerning the
sign of




Fig. 1 R&D spillovers and product differentiation. Source own graphic























When the technological distance is large enough (h[ 1þ logð12Þ
log c ), the technologies
adopted by firms are very different, one firm’s production will be negatively
affected by its rival’s R&D investment. By substituting Eq. (7) into the profit
function Eq. (4), we can rewrite the profit function as pFi ðxFi ; xFj Þ. In the first stage,
each firm chooses R&D effort independently to maximize the individual profit. The
SPNE of per-firm R&D effort, output, profit and social welfare is given by:
xF ¼ 2Að2 c
hþ1Þ
WF











WF ¼ ð4cþ 8 c3  2c2Þ þ 2ðc2hþ1 þ chþ1  2ch  2Þ[ 0
NF ¼ ðc2  4Þ2  2ðchþ1  2Þ2[ 0
XF ¼ ð48þ 16c 24c2  8c3 þ 3c4 þ c5Þ  4ðchþ1  2Þ2[ 0
Table 1 Four alternative scenarios. Source own table
Four alternative
scenarios
First stage (R&D) Seconde stage (production)
Full competition
(regime F)
Firms compete in R&D; each firm
decides its own R&D level given R&D
efforts of the other firm
Firms compete; each firm decides






Firms compete in R&D; each firm
decides its own R&D level given R&D
efforts of the other firm
Firms coordinate their production





Firms coordinate their R&D activities to
maximize the joint profit; cooperative
behavior in R&D does not change the
level of spillovers
Firms compete; each firm decides





Firms coordinate their R&D activities to
maximize the joint profit; cooperative
behavior in R&D does not change the
level of spillovers
Firms coordinate their production
activities to maximize the joint
profit
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2.2.2 Semi-collusion in production
Semi-collusion in Production is denoted by P, firms choose their R&D efforts non-
cooperatively, but select their outputs cooperatively. Firm i’s output, as a function
of R&D effort, can be expressed as:
qPi ðxPi ; xPj Þ ¼
Að1 cÞ þ ð1 chþ1ÞxPi þ ðch  cÞxPj
2ð1 c2Þ ð10Þ
The derivative
oqPi ðxPi ;xPj Þ
oxP
i
is always positive, and
oqPi ðxPi ;xPj Þ
oxP
j
is positive when h\1
(concave relationship); negative while h[ 1(convex relationship).
The SPNE:
xP ¼ Að2 c
hþ1  cÞ
WP











WP ¼ 4ð1 c2Þ þ chð2cþ chþ1  2Þ þ c 2[ 0
NP ¼ 8ðc3  c2  cþ 1Þ  ðchþ1  2Þ2 þ 4c c2  2chþ2[ 0
XP ¼ 12ðc3  c2  cþ 1Þ  ðchþ1  2Þ2 þ 4c c2  2chþ2[ 0
2.2.3 Semi-collusion in R&D
Firms coordinate their R&D investment in the R&D stage, and then maintain
competition in the production stage. This regime is abbreviated by R
xR ¼ 2Að1þ c
hÞ
WR











WR ¼ ðcþ 2Þ2  2ðch þ 1Þ2[ 0
XR ¼ ðc5 þ 11c4 þ 46c3 þ 86c2 þ 64cþ 16Þ þ 8ðc4h þ 4c3h þ 6c2h þ 4chÞ
 ð40c2h þ 80ch þ 2c2hþ3 þ 96chþ1 þ 48c2hþ1 þ 36chþ2 þ 18c2hþ2 þ 4chþ3Þ
[ 0
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2.2.4 Full collusion (horizontal merger)
Despite the ostensibly widespread use of Full Collusion to exploit the complemen-
tarities in firm’s R&D process, the formal literature on R&D has almost focus
exclusively on research joint venture, whereby firms share out technological
knowledge (b ¼ 1) while continuing to compete against each other in product
market (see Kamien et al. 1992).8 Here, we regard this scenario as the framework of
multi-dimensional coordination in which firms cooperate in both R&D and
production stages. Since, the products are imperfectly substitutable, Full Collusion9
means that the firms maximize their joint profit in each stage.
The SPNE of R&D effort, output, profit and welfare is given by
xM ¼ Að1þ c
hÞ
WM











WM ¼ 2ð1þ cÞ  ðch þ 1Þ2[ 0
XM ¼ 3ð1þ cÞ  ðch þ 1Þ2 ¼ WM þ ð1þ cÞ[ 0
In the following section, we will compare these four aforementioned regimes in
terms of significative relevance such as R&D investment, profit, consumer surplus
and social welfare.
3 Comparison of different regimes
3.1 R&D effort
We start with the comparison of R&D investment level and address the question:
which regime generates the highest level of R&D effort in equilibrium? To compare
individual levels of R&D under different regimes, let us define the functions fkðc; hÞ,
gkðc; hÞ and jFðc; hÞ
8 Kamien et al. (1992) provide a thorough analysis of RJV, contrasting the case of RJV Competition
where firms pool R&D results, but behave non-cooperatively at both stages, and RJV Cartelization (the
pooling of R&D results with cooperative determination of R&D investment, but competition in
subsequent product market stage). Suzumura (1992) and Suzumura and Yanagawa (1993) contain a
closely related analysis. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) do allow for merger under which firms pool
R&D results and cooperate in both stage of the game. It is worth noting that there are the analysis of the
converse case to RJV, where all firms compete in R&D stage, but then collude in outputs, see Fershtman
and Gandal (1994) and Brod and Shivakumar (1999).
9 The Full Collusion regime could be considered as horizontal merger.
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fkðc; hÞ ¼ xMðc; hÞ  xkðc; hÞ with k ¼ fF;P;Rg
gkðc; hÞ ¼ xRðc; hÞ  xkðc; hÞ with k ¼ fF;Pg




We plot the curves fkðc; hÞ ¼ 0, gkðc; hÞ ¼ 0, jFðc; hÞ ¼ 0 in c and h space and this
pattern implies the ranking of R&D efforts into five zones (Fig. 2).
Result 1
(i) When firms have same behavior in the upstream stage, the downstream
cooperation can incite firms to exert more R&D investment.
(ii) When firms adopt different technologies and produce differentiated goods
(cf. Fig. 2, green area), the firms colluding in production will invest most in
R&D.
Fig. 2 R&D investment ranking. Source own graphic
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(iii) Under technological proximity, firms with two-stage cooperation have most
incentive to invest in R&D without ambiguity.
Proof Based on Fig. 2, the R&D efforts (equilibrium) in the different regimes are
arranged in the following form
• xP[ xF[ xM[ xR (zone I)
• xP[ xM[ xF[ xR (zone II)
• xP[ xM[ xR[ xF (zone III)
• xM[ xP[ xR[ xF (zone IV)
• xM[ xR[ xP[ xF (zone V)
h
First of all, we find when firms have same behavior (cooperation or competition)
in the upstream R&D stage, firms allowed to cooperate in the product market always
exert more R&D efforts in equilibrium, compared to firms competing in the
downstream stage (xM[ xR and xP[ xF 8 c; h). As we know, R&D efforts reduce
the marginal cost and indirectly lead to a decrease of the product price. When firms
can collude in the downstream stage, they restrict their outputs for a given R&D
effort and as a consequence, the negative impact of R&D efforts on the product
price is alleviated. Conversely, an intense product competition dissipates the
benefits of R&D effort and, therefore, shrinks the incentive to invest in R&D. The
output cooperation has a positive impact on R&D investment and then induces firms
to undertake more R&D than they would under competition in the downstream
stage.
The output cooperation reinforces the R&D effort for a given behavior at
upstream stage. However, when the behavior at downstream stage is given, the
R&D cooperation does not unambiguously increase research efforts. If we compare
the regime F with the regime R (corresponding, respectively, to the lowest level in
terms of R&D effort), it is found that R&D cooperation could be detrimental to
R&D effort in zone I and zone II. This finding is in sharp contrast with the existing
literature, for instance, Kamien et al. (1992) show that xR is unambiguously greater
than xF without taking into account the close relationship emphasized in this paper.
The striking outcome we find here is that R&D investment under regime P can be
the largest (cf. Fig. 2, green area). It is different from the conventional wisdom that
merged (two-stage cooperation) firms have more incentive to invest in R&D,
because they appropriate all of the R&D efforts. The spillover effect (in zones I,II
and III) constitutes a positive, but very small externality. When firms cooperate in
the upstream stage (regimes M, R), on the one hand this small externality is
internalized, on the other hand the R&D cooperation cannot promote the spending
on common research of firms due to technological alienation (convexity). However,
Semi-collusion in Production can intensify the R&D competition by production
cooperation, and incites firms to invest more in R&D. Therefore, the regime P leads
to the highest level of R&D effort in green area. Moreover, if we restrict our
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attention to the case where the relationship between product differentiation and
R&D spillover is concave (red area), the ranking of R&D efforts
(xM[ xR[ xP[ xF) does not alter, and it is independent of the product
differentiation. It means that the Full Collusion participants spend more on R&D
than Semi-collusion ones, under concave relationship (technological proximity).
From the aggregate surplus point of view, the welfare performance of R&D
investment in the different scenarios can be gauged, and we compare them with the
First-Best welfare criterion (Suzumura 1992). ‘‘Appendix 1’’ provides the proof of
the expression xFB:
xFB ¼ Að1þ c
hÞ
ð1þ cÞ  ð1þ chÞ2 ð17Þ
Obviously, xFB is the significant standard accessing whether the R&D investment is
efficient, when the denominator ð1þ cÞ  ð1þ chÞ2 is positive.
Fig. 3 Socially first-best R&D. Source own graphic
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In Fig. 3, we plot the curves in c 2 ½0; 1
4
 and h 2 ½1; 3
2
 space to zoom and
emphasize the area xFB[ maxfxF ; xR; xP; xMg. The smooth curve xFB ¼ 0 divides
the pattern into two parts and the left one represents xFB[ 0. The intersection area
between the smooth curve and the zigzag curve (xFB ¼ xP) defines combinations of
c and h where xP[ xFB. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Henriques (1990)
show that the social optimum R&D effort was unambiguously greater than the level
of R&D investment in equilibrium under the fully cooperative or non-cooperative or
mixed10 game. Compared to them, we find the similar result when firms produce
sufficiently heterogeneous goods. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note xP can be
higher than xFB in an infinitesimal area where a higher level of R&D effort
corresponds to a wasteful duplication.
3.2 Output and consumer surplus
Due to symmetric equilibria, output is considered as an index of consumer surplus
ðCSk ¼ ð1þ cÞðqkÞ2 with k ¼ fF;P;R;MgÞ. We trace out the meaningful areas by
plotting the following curves:
Rkðc; hÞ ¼ qMðc; hÞ  qkðc; hÞ with k ¼ fF;P;Rg
Vkðc; hÞ ¼ qRðc; hÞ  qkðc; hÞ with k ¼ fF;Pg





(i) The level of output and consumer welfare in fully cooperative scenario can
be higher (cf. Fig. 4, green area) than that in partially cooperative or fully
non-cooperative situations.
(ii) When firms adopt similar technologies (concavity), R&D cooperation
(regimes M and R) encourages firms to produce more, and leads to fierce
output competition.
(iii) Firms under Full Competition can produce most and achieve the highest
level of consumer welfare (red area), if and only if they use very different
technologies and produce highly differentiated goods.
Proof Based on Fig. 4, the individual output equilibrium in the different regimes
is arranged in the following form
• qF[ qR[ qP[ qM (zone I)
• qR[ qF[ qP[ qM (zone II)
• qR[ qF[ qM[ qP (zone III)
• qR[ qM[ qF[ qP (zone IV)
10 Firms cooperate in R&D, but remain non-cooperative in output. This game corresponds to the Semi-
collusion in R&D within our framework.
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• qR[ qM[ qP[ qF (zone V)
• qM[ qR[ qF[ qP (zone VI)
• qM[ qR[ qP[ qF (zone VII)
h
Apart from Semi-collusion in Production, each regime can yield the highest level
of output (consumer surplus) for plausible parameter combinations. When firms
produce sufficiently similar goods, the Full Collusion regime ensures the highest
level (green area). This finding is in contrast with the traditional literature ‘‘the firms
under Full Competition always produce more than the firms under Full Collusion
scenarios’’11. The reason behind this is the substitutability–spillover relationship:
11 D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Henriques (1990) demonstrate the level of output in non-
cooperative two-stage case is always higher than that in fully cooperative situation. In addition, they
claim that the mixed game can generate more output than non-cooperative two-stage game for large
spillovers. These models based on the assumption of homogenous goods.
Fig. 4 The output (consumer surplus) ranking. Source own graphic
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the low level of differentiation on the one hand generates the high level of
spillovers, on the other hand, it induces firms under Full Collusion to spend more on
R&D (Result 1), accordingly the marginal cost of Full Collusion participants is
sufficiently reduced, firms under Full Collusion have interest to expand their output.
We also find that the output level is the highest in the regime R when the goods are
sufficiently differentiated (zones II,III,IV,V). Furthermore, if the sensibility
parameter h is comparatively large (technological alienation), Full Competition
generates the highest output level (zone I). The reason of the instable relationship
between qR and qM arises from the sensibility of output to R&D effort: in the




hþ1 þ 2ch  c




hþ1 þ ch  c
2ð1 c2Þ [ 0 ð19Þ




oxM , this inequality discloses that the output in the regime R is
more sensitive to R&D effort compared to the one in the regime M. In addition,
xM[ xR holds true at all time (Result 1). Indeed, qM can be greater than qR in some
zones (VI and VII).
There is no stable hierarchy because the impact of R&D effort is complicated and
exerts two conflicting effects on the output of rival firm.On the one hand, R&Deffort is
managed to induce the firm to expand output at expense of its rival by cutting down its
own production cost. It is considered as the substitutability effect (an increase in its own
output leads to a decrease in rival’s output) which is greater, the more substitutable the
products are. On the other hand, theR&Deffort can reduce the rival firm’s cost, thereby
increase its rival firm’s output. It is regarded as the spillover effect (boosting rival’s
output) which is greater the larger the spillover is. Since the spillover depends
positively on the degree of product differentiation, when products are quasi
homogeneous, both substitutability effect and spillover effect enlarge. Whether the
output (consumer surplus) increases depends on the interplay of these two conflicting
effects. If the spillover effect prevails over the substitutability effect, firms are
motivated to expand output; otherwise, they prefer to shrink output.
According to Fig. 4, it is clear that firms colluding in R&D produce more than firms
competing on R&D (qR; qM[ qP; qF) when the relationship between substitutability
and spillover is concave (h\1). This result holds always true regardless of product
differentiation. Under the circumstance that the leakage of know-how is relatively
strong (concave relationship), firms cooperating on R&D are willing to spendmore on
R&D efforts (Result 1), the marginal costs of both firms are reduced so much that the
spillover effect prevails over the substitutability effect, and firms are motivated to
expand output. The curve VF ¼ 0 is a watershed of the relationship between qR and qF
which is consistent with the corollary shown in Kamien et al. (1992)12.
12 They demonstrate the price (output) in R&D cartelization is less (more) than the price in R&D
competition if and only if c 2b.
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The relationship qR[ qP holds true for all c and h. The intuition behind this
stems from the variation of competition intensity13. Under regime R, upstream
collusion leads to much more fierce rivalry in non-cooperative output stage.
Furthermore, since firms collude in output under regime P, the market becomes
looser, and the firms have more incentives to increase the price by reducing output.
We find also that the firms colluding in output produce less than the firms
competing in production market when the goods are sufficiently differentiated
(zones I, II, III). First, the downstream output cooperation induces firms to increase
the price and decrease the output; second, as the low value for c generates the small
spillovers, the R&D efforts exerted by firm i cannot sufficiently reduce its rival ’s
marginal cost, this spillover effect is not strong enough to compensate the decrease
in output due to production cooperation, therefore, firms have to shrink output.
3.3 Profit
According to Brod and Shivakumar (1999)14 (henceforth, ‘‘BS’’), the profit under
Full Competition could be greater than under Semi-collusion in Production in some
cases. When there is the ‘‘close relationship’’ between product differentiation and
R&D spillovers, we have the following result:
Result 3
(i) The firms in Full Collusion are most profitable while the firms in Full
Competition are least profitable.
(ii) When firms adopt similar technologies (concavity), they prefer taking part
in R&D Cartel to joining in Production Cartel (cf. Fig. 5, red area).
(iii) When firms adopt different technologies (convexity), the firms in Produc-
tion Cartel could generate more profit than that in R&D Cartel (cf. green
area pP[ pR and white area pP\pR).
13 See Fershtman and Gandal (1994).
14 In an one-stage game, cartels increase industry profits and exacerbate the consumer surplus. In a model
where firms collude in production, but compete in R&D, the cartel members may be worse off and
consumers better off due to over-investment by firms eager to improve their position in the cartel. Brod
and Shivakumar (1999) analyze a two-stage model and examine the effect of semi-collusion when the
non-production activity is R&D. Firms choose their R&D effort in a first stage and output in a second
stage. They shed light on the fact that in the presence of spillovers, firms and consumers could be both
better off, peradventure both worse off, by a semi-collusive production cartel. We are attired by this
fascinating outcome. Thereupon, we try to approach the in-depth analysis and understand the driving
forces of this result. We find, however, that the findings of Brod and Shivakumar (1999) are disputable.
The incorrect SPNE values of per-firm R&D effort, output and profit due to improper handling result in
the inaccuracy of their main propositions. When the goods are sufficiently substitutable, the proposition 1
does not hold. In other words, there is no absolute predominance of production cartel in terms of R&D
effort. Since the optimum equilibrium of cartel at the production stage could be negative for certain
combination parameters (the degree of product differentiation and the level of spillovers), we find the
region D depicted as ‘‘Consumers prefer Production Cartel; firms prefer Competition’’ could not always
satisfy the conditions mentioned in proposition 2. In ‘‘Appendix 2’’, we focus upon their calculative
errors, and show what the correct solution can be.
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Proof The equilibrium individual firm’s profits are arranged:
pM[ max ½pP; pR[ min ½pP; pR[ pF 8 c; h
pM[ pR[ pP[ pF 8 c if h\1
h
When the spillover is relative to the product differentiation, the profit of the firms
in the regime P always prevails over the one in the regime F. This result is in
contrast with Brod and Shivakumar (1999) which shows that the profit under regime
F could be higher than under regime P. Furthermore, in line with semi-collusion
literature (Matsui 1989; Fershtman and Gandal 1994), we establish the possibility
that R&D Cartel is less profitable than Production Cartel.
We find that the profit of firms with fully cooperative behavior prevails over one-
dimension cooperation profit which is higher than the profit earned by the firm in
Full Competition. It is only that the relationship between two types of semi-
Fig. 5 Two types of semi-collusion. Source own graphic
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delegation can be altered. The alluring question is which type of semi-collusion
(Production Cartel or R&D Cartel) will be more beneficial for firms.
Consider D as the difference of profits in two semi-collusion scenarios:
D ¼ pP  pR ð20Þ
We examine the profit ranking with the same method used in the previous sub-
section. The result is illustrated in Fig. 5. The interesting conclusion which emerges
from this figure is that both Semi-collusion in R&D and Semi-collusion in Pro-
duction can yield more profit.
Under concave relationship (technological proximity), firms colluding in R&D
generate always more profit than firms colluding in output. The intuition of this
result is the following: compared to the regime P, the distinctive advantage of the
regime R is that firms invest more in R&D under concave relationship (See
Result 1), thereby, firms are more competitive due to cost-saving by R&D
investment; furthermore, according to Result 2, firms in the regime R produce more
than firms in the regime P. Despite the fact that R&D investment is expensive, the
profit of the firms in the regime R is still higher than that in the regime P when h\1.
The inverse outcome pP[ pR can take place for some plausible c under
convexity condition (technological alienation). In particular, when h is ap-
proximately greater than the critical value which is equal to 1:12, pP[ pR holds
always true.
3.4 Social welfare
In general, the welfare is damaged by collusion: in one-stage game, the collusion
always harms the welfare; whereas in two-stage game where firms first choose R&D
efforts, collusion reduces welfare if it occurs in each of the two stages15. We
determine which regime is the most relevant with regard to aggregate surplus
(Fig. 6).
Result 4
(i) Full Collusion can generate the highest level in social welfare, in particular
when firms produce the similar goods (cf. Fig. 6, green area).
(ii) When firms produce the differentiated goods (red area), Semi-collusion in
R&D enhances most the social welfare.
Proof Based on Fig. 6, the social welfare ranking will be:
• WF[WR[WP[WM (zone I)
• WR[WF[WP[WM (zone II)
• WR[WF[WM[WP (zone III)
• WR[WM[WF[WP (zone IV)
15 See D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Suzumura (1992).
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• WR[WM[WP[WF (zone V)
• WM[WR[WF[WP (zone VI)
• WM[WR[WP[WF (zone VII)
h
We highlight that the collusive behavior in both stages could enhance the welfare
(zones VI, VII). If we consider the social welfare equilibrium level in the Full
Competition regime as the criterion value, not only the Full Collusion regime but
also Semi-collusion can improve the welfare. For example, the regime R is the
welfare dominant regime when products are sufficiently differentiated. We find also
under concavity condition, firms colluding in R&D regardless of their production
strategy always enhance more social welfare than firms colluding in output
independently of R&D strategy. Semi-collusion in Production can lead to a decrease
in social welfare under convexity condition (zones I, II, III, IV).
Fig. 6 The welfare ranking. Source own graphic
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Although the hierarchies in terms of welfare are the same as the ones concerning
consumer surplus (output) which are depicted in Sect. 3.2 (Result 2), it is clear that
there are some points of dissimilarity, such as the location of the different zones and
the size of zones. In virtue of this dissimilarity, the discussion on antitrust policy is
unsealed. In what follows, we focus on the difference between consumer welfare
standard and total welfare standard.
3.5 Merger control: consumer welfare standard Vs total welfare standard
On the basis of Result 4, we conclude that society can benefit from not only the
cooperative behavior in one dimension (Semi-collusion in R&D or in Production)
but also from the horizontal merger (Full Collusion). Therefore, all regimes can
yield the highest level of welfare for plausible parameter combinations.
Nowadays, most countries have laws or regulations that require competition
authorities to scrutinize horizontal mergers. These authorities normally do not
examine whether a particular merger is likely to affect welfare because it substantially
lessens competition (USA) or significantly impedes effective competition (European
Union). The US or EU applies a consumer welfare criteria to mergers. Canada,
Australia andNewZealand, however, consider amerger’s effects on aggregate surplus
and had a very explicit aggregate surplus standard (Motta 2004).
Consequently, we make use of both total welfare standard and consumer welfare
standard within our framework, to analyze the difference between two above-
mentioned criteria, to examine whether the merger prohibited under aggregate
welfare standard can be authorized under consumer welfare standard or inversely.
From the perspective of competition policy, the regimes Full Competition and
Semi-collusion in R&D are considered as benchmarks. The competition authorities
authorize the merger satisfying the following condition using total welfare standard:
WM[maxfWF;WRg ð21Þ
using consumer welfare standard:
CSM[maxfCSF;CSRg ð22Þ
In Fig. 7, on the right side of curve Consumer Welfare Standard, the horizontal
merger is accepted by consumer welfare standard. Total welfare standard authorizes
the merger when the beach of parameter combination locates to the right of the
curve named Total Welfare Standard. It is straightforward that there is the gap
(dashed area) between two mentioned curves which sheds light on the looseness of
the total welfare standard and the preciseness of the consumer surplus standard. Due
to the prohibition by competition authorities, in the left side, the firms have to lean
to the less attracting regimes which yield less profit compared to merger one.
Therefore, the firms prefer the Semi-collusion in R&D (semi-collusion16) in the
prohibited merger zone (pR[ pF).
16 Note that in reality, the Production Cartel is prohibited. Thus, we exclude it in antitrust control
analysis.
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4 Concluding remarks
In the traditional one-dimensional framework, collusion increases producer profits,
but damages consumer welfare without ambiguity (Textbook17 view). However, this
argument ignores the effects of other non-production activities, such as R&D.
Recently, as shown in Revisionist18 view, within two-dimensional game, semi-
collusion may be profitable and efficient (Brod and Shivakumar 1999) under some
circumstances, while it can be unprofitable and inefficient. Previous works have
Fig. 7 Total welfare standard Vs consumer welfare standard. Source own graphic
17 The textbook view: while the firms benefit from product market collusion, consumer welfare is higher
under non-cooperation in the product market. See more in Jacquemin and Slade (1989).
18 The revisionist view: if the firms have the options for non-production activities, such as R&D, before
production, producers can be worse off and consumers can be better off. See more in Matsui (1989),
Mitchell (1993) and Fershtman and Gandal (1994).
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shown whether producers and consumers would be better off under product market
cooperation depends particularly on product differentiation and R&D spillovers.
This paper emphasizes the ‘‘close relationship’’ between product differentiation
and spillovers, and studies the significative relevance in the scenarios where firms
can either coordinate their decisions or adopt non-cooperative strategy (Full
Competition, Full Collusion and Semi-collusion regimes) at each stage. Kamien
et al. (1992) claim that the investment by firms engaged in the regime R is
unambiguously greater than that in the regime F irrespective of spillovers. We
demonstrate in fact which regime generates more R&D effort in equilibrium
depends upon both the degree of product differentiation and the technological
distance. If we restrict our attention to the concave relationship, the ranking of R&D
efforts is unalterable and independent of the product differentiation, competitions at
the upstream stage depress R&D investment. Firms colluding in R&D regardless of
their production strategy always yield more profit and generate higher social welfare
than firms colluding in output independently of R&D strategy. When products are
close substitutes, Full Collusion is a welfare-enhancing regime.
In addition, a discussion about antitrust policy is carried out. By focusing upon
the distinctness of different antitrust criteria, this framework sheds light on the
looseness of the total welfare standard and the preciseness of the consumer welfare
standard. This outcome will be verified, in future work, by considering the
interaction between Competition Authorities and firms, in a context of asymmetric
information19.
There are some possible extensions of this framework: first, we will check the
robustness of the result obtained in this paper, when there would be more than two
firms in the market; second, we will investigate whether our model can get the
similar results within a dynamic20 duopoly game, by supposing the R&D
investments for cost-reducing innovation over continuous time; third, the parameter
of spillover depends only on the degree of product differentiation in this model,
however, the government can control the parameter of spillover using the
intellectual property right policy, and it is an important extension of this model
to enrich the policy implication; fourth, the degree of product differentiation is
exogenously given in our model, however, firms have strategic incentives to control
to maximize their profit, and it is better to consider the case that the degree of
product differentiation is determined endogenously.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: First-best
The social optimum R&D effort derived from the first-best function welfare:
Wðxi; xj; qi; qjÞ ¼
X2
i¼1




piðxi; xj; qi; qjÞ qiðxi; xj; qi; qjÞ
By backward induction, qFBðxi; xjÞ is the socially First-Best output profile corre-
sponding to xi and xj. It is achieved by:
qFBðxi; xjÞ  argmaxq[ 0Wðxi; xj; qi; qjÞ
Then, the first-best welfare function WFB is defined by:






xFB  argmaxx[ 0WFBðxi; xjÞ
¼ Að1þ c
hÞ
ð1þ cÞ  ð1þ chÞ2
Appendix 2: Review of Brod and Shivakumar (1999)
There are two regimes: the one is Competition where firms compete in both the
R&D and the output markets; the other one is Production Cartel where the firms
compete in the R&D market, but collude in output market. The superscript ‘‘C’’
stands for Competition and ‘‘P’’ signifies Production Cartel.
The game is solved by backward induction and we characterize the equilibrium
outcomes of this game.
Competition
The SPNE values of per-firm R&D effort, output and profit are given by:











where A ¼ a c, h ¼ ð2 cÞð2þ cÞ2bd 2ð1þ bÞð2 bcÞ[ 0 and D ¼ ð2
cÞ2ð2þ cÞ2bd 2ð2 bcÞ2[ 0:
In the paper of Brod and Shivakumar (1999), the expression of D displayed in
page 225 is, however, DBS ¼ ð2 cÞ2ð2þ cÞ2bd 2ð1þ bÞð2 bcÞ2[ 0. We
have D DBS ¼ 2bð2 bcÞ2[ 0 that generates the underestimate of the real profit.
Production cartel











where U ¼ cþ b2cþ 4bdð1 c2Þ  2bð1 cÞ  2 and C ¼ 4þ 8bdþ 8bdc3þ
4cð1þ b 2bdÞ  c2ð1þ 2bþ b2 þ 8bdÞ. As mentioned in BS, the product bd can
be expressed in the same units as output, they assume bd ¼ 1 to simplify expres-
sions. We find whether these two expressions(U,C) are positive or not depends on
the combination of parameters c and b.
Whereas, BS consider that UBS ¼ 4ð1 cÞð1þ cÞ2bd ð1þ bÞð2 ð1þ
bÞcÞ[ 0 and CBS ¼ 8ð1 cÞ2bd ð2 ð1þ bÞcÞ[ 0. Compared to our results,
we have U UBS ¼ 4bdð1 c2Þc\0. It is clear that there is the underestimate on
R&D effort and output. These errors due to improper handling generate the
distinctive change in the following analysis. Furthermore, BS regard mistakenly
UBS and CBS as the positive terms. Taking UBS as an example, we illustrate here UBS
is negative when
• c 2 ð0:927441; 0:927886 and b 2 ð ~b1; ~b2Þ
• c 2 ½0:927886; 1 and b 2 ð0; ~b2Þ











A reappraisal of the main propositions in Brod and Shivakumar (1999).
Proposition 1 Since UBS[ 0, BS claimed the R&D effort in regime Production
Cartel is always significant, the firms colluding in output spared no effort to invest
in R&D for 0 b 1 and for all 0 c\1. In fact, their finding is not true, the crux
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of the matter is that the U could be negative21 in certain circumscription where the
optimum equilibrium R&D effort is meaningless. We find that the member firm of
cartel could have no interest in R&D processes when the goods are sufficiently





. In this in-
stance, the xP will be inferior to xC, then the proposition 1 is not always true.
In addition, Brod and Shivakumar (1999) claimed that ‘‘it is easy to show that as
b rises, the difference xP  xC declines’’ in page 226. As a matter of fact, the oðxPxCÞob
could be positive. Whether this gap enlarges or shrinks depends upon the
combination of two parameters b and c. To be more legible and intuitionistic, we
illustrate this outcome with the following graphic.
Fig. 8 The effect of b on the difference xP  xC . Source own graphic
21 U UBS ¼ 4bdð1 c2Þc\0.
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On the basis of Fig. 8, apart from the dashed zone which represents the flaw of
their proposition 1, we have not only the region, corresponding to the finding of BS,
in which the relative valuation of R&D is reduced as spillovers increase, but also the
region where the gap enlarges following the rise of spillovers. The primary reason
of omitting this positive aspect of b stems from the underestimate of R&D effort in
regime P.
Proposition 2 Brod and Shivakumar (1999) try to compare two mentioned
regimes in terms of both individual and collective incentive. They consider output as
an index of consumer surplus.
qP  qC ¼ 2dA
U
ð1 cÞ  dA
h
ð2 cÞð2þ cÞ
¼Ad 2ð1 cÞh ð2 cÞð2þ cÞUð Þ
Uh
It is straightforward, qP  qC has the same sign as the following expression:




Due to improper handling and error of judgement about U, it is mistakenly
deemed that the difference qP  qC has the same sign as the expression fBSðc; bÞ ¼
2ð1 cÞh ð2 cÞð2þ cÞU ¼ 2c4 þ ðb2þ 2bþ 3Þc3  2c2ð2b2 þ 3b 3Þ  4c
ð1 bÞ displayed in page 227. As the case stands, the difference qP  qC is also
influenced by the denominator Uh.
Concerning the difference of profit pP  pC,













it is straightforward that pP  pC has the same sign as
gðc; bÞ ¼ Ch2  2DU2 6¼ CBSh2  2DBSU2BS







BS in region D. Practically, we can find the inverse outcome
qP\qC even pP[ pC in this region.
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